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Abstract
We initiate the study of markets for private data, using differential privacy. We model a data
analyst who wishes to buy sensitive information to estimate a population statistic. The analyst
wishes to obtain an accurate estimate cheaply, while the owners of the private data experience
cost for their loss of privacy.
Our main result is that this problem can naturally be viewed and optimally solved as a
variant of a multi-unit procurement auction. We derive auctions which are optimal up to small
constant factors for two natural settings:
1. A data analyst with a fixed accuracy target, wishing to minimize his payments.
2. A data analyst with a hard budget constraint, wishing to maximize his accuracy.
In both cases, our comparison class is the set of envy-free pricings.
We then define a more stringent privacy model, and show that no individually rational
mechanism in this model can achieve non-trivial accuracy. We propose several directions for
future research to remedy this situation.
∗arpita@yahoo-inc.com
†aaroth@cis.upenn.edu
1 Introduction
Organizations such as the Census Bureau and hospitals have long maintained databases of personal
information. However, with the advent of the Internet, many corporations are now able to aggregate
enormous quantities of sensitive information, and use, buy, and sell it for financial gain. Up until
recently, the purchase and sale of private information was the exclusive domain of aggregators –
it was obtained for free from the actual owners of the data, for whom it was sensitive. However,
recently, companies such as “mint.com” and “Bynamite” have started acting as brokers for private
information at the consumer end, paying users for access to their sensitive information [Loh10,
Cli10]. Many others, such as Yahoo, Microsoft, Google, and Facebook are also implicitly engaging
in the purchase of private information in exchange for non-monetary compensation. In short,
“privacy” has become a commodity that has already begun to be bought and sold, in a variety of
ad-hoc ways.
Despite the commoditization of privacy in practice, markets for privacy lack a theoretical foun-
dation. In this paper, we initiate the rigorous study of markets for private data. Our goal is not to
provide a complete solution for the myriad problems involved in the sale of private data, but rather
to introduce a crisp model with which to investigate some of the many questions unique to the sale
of private data. The study of privacy as a commodity is of immediate relevance, and also a source
of many interesting theoretical problems: we hope that this paper elicits more new questions than
it answers.
First, let us briefly consider some of the issues that make privacy distinct from other commodi-
ties that we often deal with, and why this may complicate its sale:
1. First and foremost, in order sell privacy, it is important to be able to define and quantify
what we mean by privacy. In this regard, the commoditization of privacy has dovetailed nicely
with the development of the theoretical underpinnings of privacy: recent work on differential
privacy [DMNS06] (Definition 2.1) provides a compelling definition and a precise way in which
to quantify its sale. Importantly, as we will discuss, the guarantee of differential privacy has
a natural utility-theoretic interpretation that makes it a natural quantity to buy and sell.
2. Private data is a good that exhibits intrinsic complementarities: a data analyst will typically
not be interested in the private data of any particular individual, but rather in a representative
sample from a large population. Nevertheless, he must purchase the data from particular
individuals! Clearly, if there may be unknown correlations between individuals values for
privacy and their private data, then the typical strategy of “buying from the cheapest sellers”
is doomed to fail in this regard. How should an auction be structured by an analyst who
wishes to calculate some value which is representative of an entire population?
3. An individual’s cost for privacy may itself be private information. Suppose that Alice visits
an oncologist, and subsequently is observed to significantly increase her value for privacy:
this is of course disclosive! Is it possible to run an auction for private data that compensates
individuals for the privacy loss they incur, simply due to the effect that their bids have on
the behavior of the mechanism?
1.1 Differential Privacy as a Commodity
Differential privacy, formally defined in Section 2, was introduced by Dwork et al. [DMNS06] as
a technical definition for database privacy. Informally, an algorithm is ǫ-differentially private if
changing the data of a single individual does not change the probability of any outcome of the
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mechanism by more than an exp(ǫ) ≈ (1 + ǫ) multiplicative factor. Differential privacy also has a
natural utility-theoretic interpretation that makes it a compelling measure with which to quantify
privacy when buying or selling it1.
An important property of an ǫ-differentially private algorithm A is that its composition with
any other database-independent function f has the property that f(A) remains ǫ-differentially
private. This allows us to reason about events that might seem quite far removed from the actual
output of the algorithm. Quite literally, a guarantee of ǫ-differential privacy is a guarantee that
the probability of receiving phone calls during dinner, or of being denied health insurance will not
increase by more than an exp(ǫ) factor. This allows us to interpret differential privacy as a strong
utility theoretic guarantee that holds simultaneously for arbitrary, unknown utility functions: for
any individual, with any utility function u over (arbitrary) future events, an ǫ-differentially private
computation will decrease his future expected utility by at most an exp(−ǫ) ≈ (1−ǫ) multiplicative
factor, or equivalently, by an ǫE[u(x)] additive factor, where the expectation is taken over all future
events that the individual has preferences over. Therefore, there is a natural way for an individual
to assign a cost to the use of his data in an ǫ-differentially private manner: it should be worth to
him an ǫ-fraction of his expected future utility. We expand on this in section 2.3.
1.2 Results
Our main contribution is to show that any differentially private mechanism that guarantees a certain
accuracy must purchase a certain minimum amount of privacy from a certain minimum number
of agents (both of which depend on the desired accuracy), which reduces the problem of privately
providing an accurate answer to a relatively simple form of procurement problem. Specifically, we
study the following stylized model. There are n individuals [n], each of whom possesses a private bit
bi, which is already known by the administrator of the private database (for example, a hospital).
Each individual also has a certain cost function ci : R+ → R+, which determines what her cost ci(ǫ)
is for her private bit bi to be used in an ǫ-differentially private manner. Any feasible mechanism
must pay each individual enough to compensate him for the use of his private data. Moreover,
individuals may mis-report their cost functions in an attempt to maximize their payment, and so
we are interested in mechanisms which properly incentivize individuals to report their true cost
for privacy. On the other side of the market, the data analyst wishes to estimate the quantity
s =
∑n
i=1 bi, and must compensate each individual through the mechanism’s payments for this
estimate. The data analyst may either have a fixed accuracy objective and wish to minimize his
payments subject to obtaining the desired accuracy, or alternately have a fixed budget and wish to
maximize the accuracy of his estimate within this budget.
We first consider the simpler model, in which individuals must be compensated for loss of
privacy to their bits bi, but not for any privacy-leakage due to implicit correlations between bi and
their cost function ci (i.e., if the mechanism does not use an individual’s bit bi at all in computing
an estimate for the data analyst, the mechanism does not have to compensate individual i, even
if changing her cost function would result in a different outcome for the mechanism). In trying to
design an auction that guarantees the data analyst an accurate estimate of s, one might consider
any number of complicated mechanisms that (for example) randomly sample individuals, and then
attempt to buy from entire random samples – there are many variations therein, and indeed, this
was the direction from which we first explored the problem. Our main result is that it is not
1This utility theoretic interpretation has been used in another context: the work of McSherry and Talwar, and
Nissim, Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz [MT07, NST10] using differential privacy as a tool for traditional mechanism
design.
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necessary to consider such mechanisms. We show that we may abstract away the structure of
the mechanism, and without loss of generality consider multi-unit procurement auctions. This has
some immediate consequences: if we are interested in the setting for which the data analyst has a
fixed accuracy goal, subject to which he wishes to minimize his payment, then we show that the
standard VCG mechanism is optimal among the set of envy-free mechanisms. If we are instead
interested in the setting for which the data analyst has a fixed budget subject to which he wishes
to maximize his accuracy, then we are in a more unusual procurement-auction setting: the buyer
wishes to maximize the number of sellers he can buy from, and the cost to the sellers is a function of
who else sells their data! In this setting, we give a truthful mechanism that is instance-by-instance
optimal among the set of all fixed-price (envy free) mechanisms. We remark that our choice of
fixed-price mechanisms as a benchmark has become standard in prior-free mechanism design (see,
e.g. [HK07, HR08]), but stands on firmer ground in auction settings for which Bayesian-optimal
mechanisms are known also to charge fixed prices. We operate in a setting in which Bayesian-
optimal mechanisms are not known, and so justifying (or improving) this choice of benchmark in
our setting is an interesting open problem. (We note that [EG11] derives the Bayesian optimal
auction for a budget-constraint buyer who wants to purchase a set of items with maximum value
subject to her budget constraint, but the model in [EG11] does not capture our procurement auction
problem with externalities which arise because the amount of privacy that needs to be bought from
an individual (and therefore the cost to that seller) depends on the total number of individuals
from whom privacy is being purchased.)
We then show a generic impossibility result: it is not, in general, possible for any direct revelation
mechanism to compensate individuals for their privacy loss due to unknown correlations between
their private bits bi and their cost functions ci. If their costs are known to lie in some fixed range
initially, it is possible to offer them some non-trivial privacy guarantee, but finding the correct
model in which to study the issue of unknown correlations between data and valuation for privacy
is another important direction in which to take this research agenda.
1.3 Related Work
1.3.1 Differential Privacy and Mechanism Design
McSherry and Talwar proposed that differential privacy could itself be used as a solution concept in
mechanism design [MT07]. They observed that a differentially private mechanism is approximately
truthful, while simultaneously having some resilience to collusion. Using differential privacy as a
solution concept as opposed to dominant strategy truthfulness, they gave some improved results in
a variety of auction settings. Gupta et al. also used differential privacy as a solution concept in
auction design [GLM+10].
In a beautiful follow-up paper, Nissim, Smorodinsky, and Tennenholtz [NST10] made the point
that differential privacy may not be a compelling solution concept when beneficial deviations are
easy to find (as indeed they are in the mechanism of [MT07]). Nevertheless, they demonstrated
a generic methodology for using differentially private mechanisms as tools for designing exactly
truthful mechanisms that do not require payments, and demonstrate the utility of this framework
by designing new mechanisms for several problems.
In this paper, we consider an orthogonal problem: we do not try to use differential privacy as
a tool in traditional mechanism design, but instead try to use the tools of traditional mechanism
design to sell differential privacy as a commodity. Nevertheless, we also use the utility theoretic
properties of differential privacy that allow McSherry and Talwar to prove that it implies approx-
imate truthfulness to motivate why it is natural for individuals to have linear cost functions for
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differential privacy.
In very recent work, Xiao [X11] addresses another question at the intersection of differential
privacy and mechanism design: suppose the output of the database sanitization mechanism can be
interpreted both as a sensitive quantity that must satisfy a differential privacy requirement, as well
as the outcome of a game, the utility from which motivates agents to participate in the database in
the first place. With this interpretation, it is reasonable to imagine that participants may lie about
the bit stored in the database itself, in order to improve their utility from this game. Xiao shows
how to construct mechanisms that are simultaneously exactly truthful and differentially private,
but also shows that this conjunction of truthfulness and differential privacy may not be sufficient
to elicit truthful behavior when agents value privacy, i.e., have a cost to the information leaked by
the mechanism about their private bit. Chen et al. [CCK+11] propose a new, more general way of
measuring privacy in agents’ utility functions than that in [X11], and construct mechanisms that
are truthful when including this privacy measure in the agents’ utilities for settings that include
2-candidate voting, discrete facility location, and the Groves mechanisms for public projects. The
key differences between our work and this line of investigation arises from what is treated as private
information, i.e., what agents can lie about— the agents in our model cannot lie about their private
bit, which is already known to the database, but can strategically report their costs for privacy to
increase their payment from the analyst, whereas the agents in [X11] can lie about their private
data to improve their utility from a game whose outcome depends on this input.
1.3.2 Auctions Which Preserve Privacy
Recently, Feigenbaum, Jaggard, and Schapira considered (using a different notion of privacy) how
the implementation of an auction can affect how many bits of information are leaked about indi-
viduals bids [FJS10]. Specifically, they study to what extent information must be leaked in second
price auctions and in the millionaires problem. Protecting the privacy of bids is an important prob-
lem, and although it is not the main focus of this paper, we consider it in the context of differential
privacy in Section 5. We consider somewhat orthogonal notions of privacy and implementation
that make our results incomparable to those of [FJS10].
1.3.3 Privacy and Economics
Privacy and its relation to mechanism design has also been studied from a broader economic
perspective, although primarily in the context of how preferences for privacy by agents may affect
mechanisms, rather than in the context of markets for privacy. For example, Calzolari and Pavan
study the optimal disclosure policy when designing contracts for buyers who are in the position of
repeatedly choosing between multiple sellers [CP06], and the recent work of Taylor, Conitzer, and
Wagman [TCW10] studies the relationship between the ability of consumers to keep their identity
private, and the ability of a monopolist to engage in price discrimination.
An exception is the essay of Laudon [Lau96], which proposes the idea of a market for personal
information— a ‘National Information Market’— where individuals can choose to sell or lease their
information (possibly to be used in aggregation with other individuals’ information) in exchange
for a share of the revenue generated from its use; he argues that only individuals whose cost
from the ‘annoyance’ caused by releasing their information is lower than the payment they receive
will participate in this market. In the same spirit, the work of Kleinberg, Papadimitrou and
Raghavan [KPR01] quantifies the value of private information in some specific settings, and proposes
that individuals should be compensated for the use of their information to the extent of this value.
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Our individually rational auctions for privacy are conceptually similar to this, but are investigated
within the formal framework of differential privacy, and from the perspective of auction design.
1.3.4 Relationship to the Differential Privacy Literature
The now large literature on differential privacy (see [Dwo08] for an excellent overview) has almost
exclusively focused on techniques for guaranteeing ǫ-differential privacy for various tasks, where ǫ
has been taken as a given parameter. What has been almost entirely missing is any normative
guidance for how to pick ǫ. There is a natural tradeoff between the privacy parameter ǫ and the
accuracy of privacy-preserving estimates (which is well-understood in the case of single statistics,
see [GRS09, BN10]). Therefore, this paper proposes to answer the question of how ǫ should be
chosen: it should be the smallest value that the data analyst is able to afford, given the individuals’
valuations for privacy (or equivalently, the smallest value that the owners of the data are willing
to accept in exchange for their payment).
We also highlight in this work the explicit tradeoff between compensating individuals for the use
of their private information, and the accuracy of our resulting estimates. Implicit in previous works
on privacy has been the idea that for fixed values of ǫ, individuals should be willing to participate
in private databases given only some small positive incentive. However, this incentive may be
different for different individuals, and without running an auction, a data collector is engaging in
selection bias: he is only collecting data from those individuals who value their privacy at a low
enough level to make participation in a given database worth while. Such individuals might not
be representative of the general population, and resulting estimates may therefore be inaccurate.
This source of inaccuracy is hidden in previous works, but we point out that it should be a real
concern, and we explicitly address it in this paper.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a database consisting of the data of n individuals {1, . . . , n} whom we denote by [n].
Each individual i is associated with a private bit bi ∈ {0, 1}, as well as a value vi parameterizing
a cost function which quantifies their cost for loss of privacy. (We may think of the private bit
as representing the answer to some arbitrary yes or no question. For the sake of discussion, let
us assume that the private bit represents whether the individual has some embarrassing medical
condition.) The private bit bi is verifiable, and the individual is not endowed with the ability
to lie about their private bit. For example, the bit may already be known to a trusted database
administrator (for example a hospital), or may be directly verifiable by the auctioneer (e.g. through
a blood or saliva sample). On the other hand, the individual may lie about their value for privacy
vi, and must be incentivized to report this parameter truthfully. We formalize this model in the
following section.
2.1 Differential Privacy
Formally, a data set or database D of size n is a collection of n elements from some abstract range
X: D ∈ Xn. We think of each element in the database as corresponding to the data of a single
individual. Two databases D,D(i) ∈ Xn are neighbors if they differ only in the data of a single
individual, i.e., if Dj = D
(i)
j for all j 6= i. The quantification of privacy we employ is that of
differential privacy, due to Dwork et al. [DMNS06]:
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Definition 2.1. An algorithm A : Xn → R (for an abstract range R) satisfies ǫi-differential privacy
with respect to individual i if for any pair of neighboring databases D,D(i) ∈ Xn differing only in
their i’th element, and for any event S ⊂ R:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S]
Pr[A(D(i)) ∈ S] ≤ e
ǫi
An algorithm A is ǫi-minimally private with respect to individual i if ǫi = inf ǫ such that A is
ǫ-differentially private with respect to individual i. Throughout this paper, whenever we say that an
algorithm is ǫi-differentially private, we mean that it is ǫi-minimally differentially private.
Remark 2.2. A couple of remarks are in order. First note that (unless A computes a constant
function) for A to be differentially private it must be a randomized algorithm. Second, note that
differential privacy states intuitively that no single individual can have a large effect on the output
distribution of an algorithm A, and hence the output of A contains little “information” about any
individual. Indeed, if B is a random variable taking values in Xn, stating that A is ǫ-differentially
private with respect to each individual i is a stronger guarantee (and in particular implies) that the
mutual information between B and A(B) is at most ǫ: I(B;A(B)) ≤ ǫ. In particular, note that
as a privacy guarantee, ǫ-differential privacy becomes less meaningful for large values of ǫ. In this
paper, we will restrict our attention to values of ǫ < 1. Note that in this case, exp(ǫ) ≈ 1 + ǫ.
The following easy fact follows immediately [DMNS06]:
Fact 1. Consider an algorithm A : Xn → R that satisfies ǫi-differential privacy with respect to
each individual i, and let T ⊂ [n] denote a set of indices. Consider two databases D,DT ∈ Xn at
Hamming distance |T | that differ exactly on the indices in T . Then for any event S ⊆ R:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S]
Pr[A(DT ) ∈ S] ≤ e
∑
i∈T ǫi
Proof. Consider the sequence of databases D0, . . . ,D|T | such that D0 = D, D|T | = DT and for each
0 ≤ i < |T |, databases Di and Di+1 are neighbors, differing in exactly the i’th index of T . Then
for any event S:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S]
Pr[A(DT ) ∈ S] =
|T |−1∏
i=0
Pr[A(Di) ∈ S]
Pr[A(Di+1) ∈ S] ≤
∏
i∈T
exp(ǫi) = exp(
∑
i∈T
ǫi)
A useful primitive for differential privacy is the Laplacian distribution, adding random noise
from which produces differentially private output [DMNS06]:
Definition 2.3. Denote by Lap(σ) the symmetric Laplacian distribution with mean 0 and scaling
σ. This distribution has probability density function:
f(x) =
1
2σ
exp
(
−|x|
σ
)
We will sometimes abuse notation and write Lap(σ) to denote the realization of a random variable
drawn from the Laplacian distribution with parameter σ.
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2.2 Mechanism Design
In this section, we specify the utility function of the participants in the mechanism, and in particular,
how it relates to the privacy guarantees of the mechanism.
Every individual i has some (unknown to the mechanism) single-parameter cost function with
parameter vi, written c(vi, ·) : R+ → R+, where c(vi, ǫ) represents player i’s cost for having his
data used in an ǫ-differentially private manner. Cost functions are normalized so that c(vi, 0) = 0
for all vi, and are assumed to be continuous. We will study two models, informally, one of which
will treat an individuals data only as his private bit bi, and one of which will treat his data as the
tuple (vi, bi). Each individuals cost function belongs to the same publicly known family, but the
parameter vi is known only to the individual, and must be reported to the mechanism. We will
require that the family of cost functions admit a total ordering independently of ǫ. That is, the
property that our results will require is that for any i 6= j, and for any ǫ ∈ R+, it should hold that
c(vi, ǫ) ≤ c(vj , ǫ) if and only if vi ≤ vj . Natural choices of cost functions which obey this property
are linear cost functions, which take the form c(vi, ǫ) = viǫ, exponential cost functions which take
the form c(vi, ǫ) = exp(ǫvi), quadratic cost functions of the form c(vi, ǫ) = viǫ
2, as well as many
other natural choices.
A mechanism M : Rn+ × {0, 1}n → R × Rn+ takes as input a vector of cost parameters v =
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn+ and a collection of private bit values b ∈ {0, 1}n, and outputs a real number (an
estimate of some statistic sˆ of b of interest to the “data analyst”), as well as a payment that will
be collected from the data analyst to be distributed to the participants in the mechanism.
We consider two models of privacy:
1. In the insensitive value model, the mechanism M first inspects the reported cost parameters
v and then selects (as an arbitrary deterministic function of v) a randomized algorithm A :
{0, 1}n → R together with a set of payments p1, . . . , pn. The mechanism then computes A(b),
which is ǫi-differentially private with respect to each individual i, for some ǫi. M outputs a
statistic sˆ = A(b), and each individual i experiences cost c(vi, ǫi). Note that in this model,
individuals incur privacy cost only as a function of the use of their private bit bi, and not as
a function of the use of their value for privacy vi: the algorithm is free to use vi in any way.
The algorithm pays each individual pi, and collects P ≥
∑n
i=1 pi from the data analyst. Note
that the output of the mechanism from the data analyst’s perspective is the pair (sˆ, P ).
2. In the sensitive value model, M is some randomized algorithm M : Xn → R, for X =
R+×{0, 1} and R = R+×R+: i.e. its input is a set of n tuples (vi, bi) one for each individual,
and its output is a pair of reals: a statistic sˆ and a payment collected from the data analyst
P . M itself is ǫi-differentially private with respect to each individual I for some ǫi, and
each individual experiences cost c(vi, ǫi). The mechanism compensates each individual an
(unobserved) amount pi, with the restriction that
∑n
i=1 pi ≤ P . Note that in this model,
individuals experience cost as a function of the use of both their private bit bi, as well as their
reported value for privacy vi.
Note that in both cases, the data analyst only learns the total payment P that he must make,
not necessarily the distributions pi which are made to each individual.
For any v′i ∈ R+ we let (v−i, v′i) denote the vector that results from changing entry vi in v to v′i.
A player i who recieves payment pi, and whose data is used in an ǫi-differentially private way
derives utility ui = pi− c(vi, ǫi). Here, ǫi is the privacy parameter of the selected algorithm A if we
are in the insensitive value model, and is the privacy parameter of the mechanism M if we are in
the sensitive value model.
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Since any individual may opt against participating in our mechanism, we require first that our
mechanisms be individually rational :
Definition 2.4. A mechanism M : Rn+×{0, 1}n → R×Rn+ is individually rational if for all v ∈ Rn+:
pi(v) ≥ c(vi, ǫi(v))
where here the payment vectors and privacy parameters are viewed as functions of the vector of
reported types v. If pi(v) and ǫi(v) are random variables, we require that our mechanisms are ex-
post individually rational: that is, the above inequality must hold for all realizations of pi(v) and
ǫi(v). In words, each player must be guaranteed non-negative utility by participating and truthfully
reporting his value to the mechanism.
Since individuals may misreport their costs so as to maximize their gain, we also require our
mechanisms to be truthful :
Definition 2.5. A mechanism M : Rn+ × {0, 1}n → R × Rn+ is dominant-strategy truthful if for
all v ∈ Rn+, for all i ∈ [n], and for all v′i ∈ R+:
pi(v)− c(vi, ǫi(v)) ≥ pi(v−i, v′i)− c(vi, ǫi(v−i, v′i))
that is, no player can ever increase his utility by misreporting his value for privacy. If pi(v) and ǫi(v)
are random variables, the above inequality should hold in expectation over the internal randomness
of the mechanism2.
The mechanism is run on behalf of some data analyst, who wishes to know an estimate of the
statistic s ≡∑ni=1 bi. The mechanism outputs some randomized estimate of this quantity sˆ, where
the randomization is to ensure differential privacy, and the analyst prefers more accurate answers.
We choose to focus on statistics which can be represented as sums of boolean variables because
of the central role that they play in the privacy literature (in which they are known as counting
queries or predicate queries). In particular, the ability to accurately answer queries of this sort is
sufficient to be able to implement a wide range of machine learning algorithms over the data (see
[BDMN05]).
Definition 2.6. A mechanism M satisfies k-accuracy if for any D ∈ {0, 1}n, it outputs an estimate
sˆ such that:
Pr[|sˆ− s| ≥ k] ≤ 1
3
where the probability is taken over the internal coins of the mechanism.
The constant 1/3 is of course inconsequential: it can be changed to any desired constant without
qualitatively affecting the results.
We may consider two dual objectives for our mechanism. Our data analyst may have a fixed
goal of k-accuracy for some k in which case we want to design mechanisms which deliver k-accurate
estimates of s so as to minimize the sum of the payments. Alternately, our data analyst may have
a fixed budget B ∈ R+ (say an NSF grant that can be used for data procurement). In this case,
our goal is to design a mechanism which is k-accurate for the smallest possible value of k, while
under the constraint that the sum of the payments never exceeds B.
2That is, we require only truthfulness in expectation. However, all of our mechanisms will in fact be ex-post
truthful, and in fact the payment schemes will be deterministic. Our lower bounds will hold even for mechanisms
which are merely truthful in expectation, which only strengthens our results.
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2.3 Valuing Differential Privacy
In this section, we provide a brief justification for why individuals should be able to quantify their
cost for experiencing an ǫ-differentially private use of their private data. Say that A denotes the
set of all future events for which an individual i has preferences over outcomes, and ui : A → R is a
function mapping events to i’s utility for that event. Suppose that D ∈ Xn is a data-set containing
individual i’s private data, and that M : Xn → R is a mechanism operating on D promising
ǫi-differential privacy to individual i. Let D
′ be a data-set that is identical to D except that it
does not include the data of individual i (equivalently, it includes the data of individual i, but it
is used in a 0-differentially private manner), and let f : R → ∆A be the (arbitrary) function that
determines the distribution over all future events, conditioned on the output of mechanism M .
A basic consequence of differential privacy is the following:
Fact 2. If M : Xn → R is ǫi-differentially private with respect to individual i, and f : R → R′ is
any arbitrary (randomized) function, then the composition f ◦M : Xn → R′ is also ǫi-differentially
private with respect to individual i.
Proof. First, assume that f is a deterministic function f : R → R′. Fix any event S ⊂ R′ and let
T ⊂ R be T = {r ∈ R : f(r) ∈ S}. Now for any pair of neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ Xn differing
in their i’th coordinate, we have:
Pr[f(M(D)) ∈ S] = Pr[M(D) ∈ T ]
≤ eǫi Pr[M(D′) ∈ T ]
= eǫi Pr[f(M(D′)) ∈ S]
which is what we wanted. To see that the same result holds for randomized mappings f , it suffices to
observe that any randomized mapping f : R→ R′ is simply a convex combination of deterministic
functions f : R→ R′.
By the guarantee of differential privacy together with Fact 2, we have:
Ex∼f(M(D))[ui(x)] =
∑
x∈A
ui(x) · Pr
f(M(D))
[x]
≤
∑
x∈A
ui(x) · exp(ǫi) Pr
f(M(D′))
[x]
= exp(ǫi)Ex∼f(M(D′))[ui(x)]
Similarly,
Ex∼f(M(D))[ui(x)] ≥ exp(−ǫi)Ex∼f(M(D′))[ui(x)]
Therefore, when individual i is deciding whether or not to allow his data to be used in an
ǫi-differentially private way, he is facing the decision about whether he would like his data to be
used in such a way that could change his future utility by at most an additive factor of
∆ui ≡ (exp(ǫi)− 1)Ex∼f(M(D′))[ui(x)]
and so this is a natural quantity for i to value his privacy at. This naturally motivates a cost
function of the form c(vi, ǫi) = (exp(ǫi) − 1)vi, setting vi = Ex∼f(M(D′))[ui(x)]). Note that for
small values of ǫi, (exp(ǫi) − 1) ≈ ǫi, which also motivates linear utility functions of the form:
c(vi, ǫi) = ǫivi. Both of these types of cost functions are accommodated by our model, as well as
many other reasonable choices.
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3 Characterizing Accurate Mechanisms
In this section, we show necessary and sufficient conditions on the amount of privacy that a mecha-
nism must purchase from each individual in order to guarantee a fixed level of accuracy. To obtain a
given level of accuracy, we show that a mechanism must purchase at least ǫ units of privacy, from at
least |H| individuals, where the values of ǫ and |H| depend on the desired accuracy. We emphasize
that these necessary conditions are independent of any truthfulness requirements on the mecha-
nism, and arise purely because of the need to achieve accuracy. These conditions apply to both the
sensitive value model and the insensitive value model. This greatly simplifies the mechanism-design
process for auctions for private data, because it allows us to restrict our attention to multi-unit
procurement auctions without loss of generality.
Theorem 3.1. Let 0 < α < 1. Any differentially private mechanism that is α · n/4-accurate must
select a set of users H ⊆ [n] such that:
1. ǫi ≥ 1αn for all i ∈ H.
2. |H| ≥ (1− α)n.
Proof. Let M be a mechanism that is α · n/4-accurate, and let H ⊂ [n] be the set of individuals i
such that ǫi ≥ 1/αn. For point of contradiction, suppose that |H| < (1 − α)n. Let H¯ = [n] \H.
We have that |H¯| > αn. Let S = {x ∈ R : |x − s| < αn4 }, where s =
∑n
i=1 bi. By the accuracy of
the mechanism, we have that the estimate sˆ output by the mechanism M(v,D) satisfies:
Pr[sˆ ∈ S] ≥ 2
3
.
Let H¯1 = {i ∈ H¯ : bi = 1} and let H¯0 = {i ∈ H¯ : bi = 0}. Since H¯0 and H¯1 form a partition of H¯,
it must be that
max(|H¯0|, |H¯1|) > αn/2.
Without loss of generality, assume that |H¯0| > αn/2 (the other case is identical). Let T ⊂ H¯0
such that |T | = αn/2. Let D′ be the database that results in setting each bit b′i = bi if i 6∈ T , and
b′i = 1 otherwise. Note that D
′ and D have hamming distance |T | = αn/2, and differ exactly on
the indices of T . Let sˆ′ be the estimate generated by M(v,D′). By differential privacy of M , we
have, using Fact 1:
Pr[sˆ′ ∈ S] ≥ exp(−
∑
i∈T
ǫi) · Pr[sˆ ∈ S]
≥ exp(−αn
2
· 1
αn
) · 2
3
=
2
3
√
e
>
1
3
.
Let s′ =
∑n
i=1 b
′
i. Note that s
′ = s + αn/2. If sˆ′ ∈ S, then by definition: |sˆ′ − s| < αn/4. By the
triangle inequality, we must therefore have that |sˆ′ − s′| > αn/4 with probability strictly greater
than 1/3, contradicting the assumption that M is α · n/4 accurate.
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This theorem can be thought of as our main result, quantifying the necessary trade-off between
accuracy and privacy: to guarantee αn/4-accuracy, at least (1−α) fraction of the population must
incur at least a 1αn privacy loss. The corollary below follows immediately, translating this into a
lower bound on payment.
Corollary 3.2. Any αn-accurate individually rational mechanism must pay out a total payment of
at least:
n∑
i=1
pi ≥
(1−4α)n∑
i=1
c
(
vi,
1
4αn
)
where bidders are ordered such that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ · · · ≤ vn.
We remark that this corollary assumes only individual rationality, and is in general achievable
only by an omniscient mechanism that knows all players’ cost functions. No truthful αn-accurate
mechanism is able to pay as little as this benchmark in general.
Theorem 3.1 gave necessary conditions on the privacy costs of an accurate mechanism. Next,
we show that up to small constant factors, they are also sufficient conditions for an accurate
mechanism:
Theorem 3.3. Let 0 < α < 1. There exists a differentially private mechanism that is (12+ln 3)α·n-
accurate and selects a set of individuals H ⊆ [n] such that:
1. ǫi =
{
1
αn , for i ∈ H;
0, for i 6∈ H.
2. |H| = (1− α)n.
Proof. Let H ⊂ [n] be any collection of individuals of size |H| = (1−α)n, selected independently of
their private bits bi, and let t =
∑
i∈H bi+αn/2. Observe that for any database D, |t− s| ≤ αn/2.
Consider the mechanism that outputs sˆ = t + Lap(αn). First, we claim that this mechanism
is (1/2 + ln 3)αn-accurate. This follows by the triangle inequality conditioned on the event that
Lap(αn) ≤ (ln 3)αn. It remains to verify that this holds with probability at least 2/3. This is in
fact the case:
Pr[|Lap(αn)| ≥ (ln 3)αn] = 1
2αn
∫ −(ln 3)αn
−∞
exp
(
− |x|
αn
)
dx
+
1
2αn
∫ ∞
(ln 3)αn
exp
(
− |x|
αn
)
dx
=
1
3
.
We now verify the differential privacy guarantee, which follows from the analysis given in [DMNS06]
of the Laplace mechanism. Let sˆ be the estimate calculated on database D (via sum t) and let sˆ′
be the estimate calculated on neighboring database D(i) (via sum t′). Clearly, for any i 6∈ H and
for any S ⊂ R, Pr[sˆ ∈ S] = Pr[sˆ′ ∈ S] and so ǫi = 0. Now consider some i ∈ H and S ⊂ R. For
11
any S ⊂ R and r ∈ R, let S − r denote {x− r : x ∈ S}.
Pr[sˆ ∈ S] = Pr[Lap(αn) ∈ S − t]
=
∫
x∈S−t
1
2αn
exp
(
− |x|
αn
)
dx
≤ exp
(
1
αn
)
·
∫
x∈S−t′
1
2αn
exp
(
− |x|
αn
)
dx
= exp
(
1
αn
)
· Pr[sˆ′ ∈ S]
where the inequality follows from the fact that |t− t′| ≤ 1.
Theorems 3.3 and 3.1 taken together have the effect of greatly simplifying the space of possible
mechanisms for private data that we need to consider. They imply that without loss of generality
(up to small constant factors in their error term), when searching for αn-accurate mechanisms, we
may restrict our attention to a special class of multi-unit procurement auctions, where we seek to
purchase exactly 1/αn units of some good (in this case, differential privacy) from exactly (1− α)n
individuals. Once we do this, we have purchased a sufficient quantity of privacy to run the Laplace
mechanism employed in Theorem 3.3, which guarantees the desired accuracy! In the next section,
we consider such mechanisms.
We note that at first blush, one might expect to be able to get an accurate estimate while setting
ǫi = 0 for most individuals, by taking a random and (with high probability) representative sample
of the individuals, and operating only on their sampled bits. However, note that an algorithm
A which takes a random sample S of the population, and then runs an ǫ-differentially private
algorithm A′ on the sample S results in a privacy cost ǫi > 0 to every individual who has a non-
zero probability of having been selected for the sample S, so long as ǫ > 0. That is, sampling
(and other randomization procedures) can be a part of the algorithms that we consider, but do not
escape our lower bounds.
4 Deriving Truthful Mechanisms in the Insensitive Value Model
We now give several positive results in the insensitive value model.
4.1 Maximizing Accuracy Subject to a Budget Constraint
In this section, following the characterization of accurate mechanisms in Section 3, we restrict our
attention to algorithms that guarantee O(αn)-accuracy by purchasing 1/αn units of privacy from
exactly (1 − α)n individuals. We consider the problem of obtaining an estimate sˆ of maximum
accuracy, subject to a hard budget constraint3:
∑n
i=1 pi ≤ B. This is a natural objective, for
example, in the case of a data analyst who has B dollars of grant money with which to buy data
for a study, and wishes to buy the most accurate data that he can afford. We give a truthful and
individually rational mechanism for this problem, and show that it is instance-by-instance optimal
among the class of envy-free mechanisms.
We first prove that FairQuery is truthful and individually rational.
3This question is related to the problem of designing budget feasible mechanisms in [Sin10, CGL11, EG11], but
differs in that our privacy auction has externalities: a seller’s cost for her good is a function of how many other sellers
are chosen as winners by the mechanism.
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FairQuery(v,D,B) :
Sort v such that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ . . . ≤ vn.
Let k be the largest integer such that c(vk,
1
n−k ) ≤ Bk .
Output sˆ =
∑k
i=1 bi +
n−k
2 + Lap(n− k)
Pay each i > k pi = 0 and each i ≤ k pi = min(Bk , c(vk+1, 1n−k ).
Theorem 4.1. FairQuery is truthful and individually rational, and never exceeds the data analyst’s
budget B.
Proof. First note that by the analysis from Theorem 3.3, for any i ≤ k, ǫi = 1n−k , and for any
i > k, ǫi = 0. For i > k therefore, pi = c(vi, 0) = 0. For i ≤ k, pi = min(Bk , c(vk+1, 1n−k )) ≥
c(vi,
1
(n−k)) because c(vi,
1
(n−k)) ≤ B/k by construction and vi ≤ vi+1 by definition (recall that
c(v, ǫ) is increasing in v for every ǫ). Hence, individual rationality is satisfied. Note also that∑n
i=1 pi = k ·min(Bk , c(vk+1, 1n−k )) ≤ B, and so the budget constraint is also satisfied. It remains
to verify truthfulness:
Fix any v, i, v′i and consider k = k(v), k
′ = k(v−i, v
′
i), pi = pi(v), p
′
i = p
′
i(v−i, v
′
i), ǫi = ǫi(v), and
ǫ′i = ǫ
′
i(v−i, v
′
i). There are four cases:
1. Case 1: v′i < vi and pi > 0. In this case, v
′
i moves earlier in the ordering and ǫi = ǫ
′
i, and
pi = p
′
i.
2. Case 2: v′i > vi and pi = 0. In this case, v
′
i moves later in the ordering and ǫi = ǫ
′
i = pi =
p′i = 0.
3. Case 3: v′i < vi and pi = 0. In this case, v
′
i moves earlier in the ordering, but if p
′
i > 0 then by
construction p′i = min(
B
k′ , c(vk′+1,
1
n−k′ )) ≤ c(vi, 1(n−k′)). This follows because k′ is such that
vk′+1 ≤ vi for all i > k such that p′i > 0.
4. Case 4: v′i > vi and pi > 0. In this case, v
′
i moves later in the ordering, and either p
′
i = pi
and ǫ′i = ǫi, or p
′
i = 0 and ǫi = 0. In the second case, by individual rationality, pi− c(vi, ǫi) ≥
0 = p′i − c(vi, ǫ′i).
Thus in all four cases, deviations are not beneficial, and the mechanism is truthful.
The next natural question to ask is: does FairQuery guarantee the data analyst a good level of
accuracy, given his budget? As is always the case in prior-free mechanism design, it is important
to specify what our benchmark is – good compared to what? Because mechanisms of the kind that
we are considering always buy the same amount of privacy from an individual from whom they buy
any privacy at all, a natural benchmark to consider is the set of all “envy-free” mechanisms which
guarantee that no individual would prefer the outcome granted to any other.
Definition 4.2. A mechanism for private data is envy-free if for all possible valuation vectors v,
and for all individuals i, j, pi−c(vi, ǫi) ≥ pj−c(vi, ǫj). That is, after the mechanism has determined
the privacy costs and payments to each individual, there are no individuals who would prefer to have
the payment and privacy cost granted to any other individual.
Observation 4.3. Any truthful envy-free mechanism which buys either no privacy or ǫ-privacy
from each individual (i.e., if ǫi > 0, ǫj > 0 then ǫi = ǫj) must have the property that for all i, j
with ǫi > ǫj > 0, pi = pj. Call such mechanisms fixed purchase mechanisms. That is, envy free
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fixed purchase mechanisms must pay each individual from whom privacy is purchased the same fixed
price.
Note that by the characterization in Section 3, we may restrict ourselves to considering fixed
purchase mechanisms essentially without loss of generality (we may lose only a small constant
factor in the approximation factor). Therefore we can compare our mechanism to the envy free
benchmark:
Proposition 4.4. For any set of valuations v ∈ Rn+ (i.e., on an instance-by-instance basis) Fair-
Query achieves the optimal accuracy given budget B, among the set of all truthful, individually
rational envy-free fixed purchase mechanisms.
Proof. First, observe the easy fact that FairQuery is indeed an envy free fixed purchase mechanism.
We then merely observe that for any vector of valuations v, if FairQuery sets ǫi > 0 for k individuals,
then by the definition of k, it must be that c(vk+1,
1
(n−k−1)) >
B
k+1 , and so any mechanism that
set ǫi > 0 for k
′ individuals for k′ > k must have pk+1 >
B
(k+1) by individual rationality. But by
envy-freeness, it must have pi = pk+1 >
B
(k+1) for all i ≤ k. But in this case, we would have
n∑
i=1
pi ≥ k′ · pk+1 > (k + 1) · B
k + 1
= B
which would violate the budget constraint.
4.2 Minimizing Payment Subject to an Accuracy Constraint
In this section, we consider mechanisms for the dual goal of truthfully obtaining a k-accurate
estimate for some fixed accuracy constraint k while minimizing the payment required. Again, we
restrict ourselves to the model of multi-unit procurement auctions justified in Section 3. In this
setting, we show that the VCG mechanism is in fact optimal.
Recall that for a fixed accuracy goal αn, by Theorem 3.3, it is sufficient to buy (1/2+ln 3)αn
units of privacy from (1 − α(1/2+ln 3))n people. We may therefore view our setting as a multi-unit
procurement auction in which every individual is selling a single good ( (1/2+ln 3)αn units of privacy),
for which they have valuation ci(vi,
(1/2+ln 3)
αn ). The constraint on accuracy simply states that we
must buy (1 − α(1/2+ln 3))n units of the good. In this case, we can analyze a simple application of
the standard VCG mechanism:
MinCostAuction(v,D, α):
Let α′ = α1/2+ln 3 and k = ⌈(1− α′)n⌉.
Let wi = c(vi,
1
n−k ).
Sort wi such that w1 ≤ w2 ≤ . . . ≤ wn.
Output sˆ =
∑k
i=1 bi +
n−k
2 + Lap(α
′n)
Pay each i > k pi = 0 and each i ≤ k pi = wk+1.
We first show that MinCostAuction does indeed satisfy the constraints of truthfulness and
individual rationality, while obtaining sufficient accuracy.
Proposition 4.5. MinCostAuction is truthful, individually rational and αn-accurate.
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Proof. That MinCostAuction is αn-accurate follows immediately from Theorem 3.3. Moreover, by
Theorem 3.3, for each i ≤ k, ǫi = 1/(α′n) and for i > k, ǫi = 0. Truthfulness and individual
rationality then follow immediately from the fact that each wi = ci(vi, 1/(α
′n)), that ci(·, ǫ) is
an increasing function of vi, and that MinCostAuction is an instantiation of the classical VCG
mechanism.
MinCostAuction achieves its target utility at a cost of
∑n
i=1 pi = k · wk+1. We now show that
no other envy-free multi-unit procurement auction with the same accuracy guarantees (i.e. one
that guarantees buying k units) makes smaller payments than MinCostAuction.
Theorem 4.6. No truthful, individually rational, envy-free fixed purchase auction that guarantees
purchasing k units can have total payment less than k · wk+1.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose we have such a mechanism M . Fix some vector of
valuations v that yields payments p(v) such that
∑n
i=1 pi(v) < k ·wk+1 (Recall that wi = c(vi, 1n−k )).
First, if it is not already the case, we will construct a bid profile such that an item is purchased from
some seller who is not among the k lowest bidders. It must be that there exists some i such that an
item is purchased from i at a price of pi, such that wi ≤ pi < wk+1 (otherwise
∑n
i=1 pi(v) ≥ k·wk+1).
Let v′ = (v−i, v
′
i) where c(v
′
i,
1
n−k ) = (pi + wk+1)/2, be a bid profile in which bidder i raises his
reported value to be above pi while remaining below wk+1. Note that such a v
′
i exists since c is
assumed to be continuous. Let p′ = p′(v) be the new payment vector. By individual rationality and
truthfulness, it must be that in this new bid profile v′, player i is no longer allocated an item: by
individual rationality, he would have to be paid p′i > pi if he were allocated an item, but if his true
valuation were wi, then this would be a beneficial deviation, contradicting truthfulness. Because
the mechanism is constrained to always buy at least k items, it must be that in v′, an item is now
purchased from some seller j such that j ≥ k+1. By individual rationality, p′j ≥ wj ≥ wk+1. But by
envy-freeness, it must be that for every seller i from whom an item was purchased, p′i = p
′
j ≥ wk+1.
Because at least k items are purchased, we therefore have
∑n
i=1 p
′
i ≥ k · wk+1, which contradicts
the purported payment guarantee of mechanism M .
5 Truthful Mechanisms in the Sensitive Value Model
In Section 4, we considered truthful, individually rational mechanisms that compensated users for
the privacy loss due to the mechanisms’ use of the individual’s private bits bi, but not due to the
mechanisms’ use of their valuations for privacy, vi. Nevertheless, as we observed in the introduction,
it is quite reasonable to assume that individual’s valuations for privacy are correlated with their
private bits. Can we design mechanisms that treat individuals’ valuations for privacy as private
data as well, and compensate individuals for the privacy loss due to the use of their valuations
vi? In this section, we show that the answer is generically ‘no’ if we allow individuals to have
arbitrarily high valuations for privacy. Moreover, we note that if we try to impose an a-priori
bound on individual’s valuations for privacy, then we re-introduce the same source of sampling bias
that we had hoped to solve by running an auction.
Recall that a mechanism has two outputs: the estimate sˆ, and the payment P that the data
analyst must make. Note that if the bids are private data as well (i.e. if we are in the sensitive
value model), then a mechanism which is ǫi-differentially private with respect to bidder i must
satisfy, for every set of estimate/payment tuples S ⊂ R2+ and for each (v,D) ∈ Rn+ × {0, 1}n,
Pr[M(v,D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫi) Pr[M(v(i),D(i)) ∈ S], where v(i) and D(i) are arbitrary vectors that are
identical to v and D everywhere except possibly on their ith index.
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Theorem 5.1. If bidder valuations for privacy may be arbitrarily large (i.e., v ∈ Rn+) then no
individually rational direct revelation mechanism M can protect the privacy of the bidder valuations
and promise k-accuracy for any k < n/2 (i.e., any nontrivial value).
Proof. For simplicity, consider bidders with linear cost functions: ci(vi, ǫi) = vi · ǫi. Assume that
M is k-accurate for some k < n/2. Run the mechanism M(v,D) and obtain an estimate sˆ and
privacy costs ǫi for each i ∈ [n]. Let P =
∑n
i=1 pi be the payment that the data analyst makes.
By individual rationality, P ≥ ∑ni=1 viǫi ≥ mini vi ·∑ni=1 ǫi. We trivially have that either Pr[sˆ ∈
[0, n/2)] ≥ 1/2 or Pr[sˆ ∈ [n/2, n]] ≥ 1/2. Without loss of generality, assume Pr[sˆ ∈ [0, n/2)] ≥ 1/2.
Let D′ = 1n, and let sˆ′ be the estimate obtained by running M(v,D′). By accuracy, we have that:
Pr[sˆ′ ∈ (n/2, n]] ≥ 23 . However, by differential privacy, together with Fact 1 we have:
2
3
≤ Pr[sˆ′ ∈ (n/2, n]] ≤ exp(
n∑
i=1
ǫi)Pr[sˆ ∈ (n/2, n]]
≤
exp(
∑
n
i=1
ǫi)
2
Solving, we find that
∑n
i=1 ǫi ≥ ln(4/3), independent of v. We therefore have by individual ratio-
nality that Pr[P ∈ [0, ln(4/3)mini vi)] = 0. By differential privacy, this must hold simultaneously
for all inputs to the mechanism (v,D): that is, such a mechanism can not charge a finite price P
for any input, which completes the proof.
Remark 5.2. A natural (partial) way around the impossibility result of Theorem 5.1 is to restrict
bidder valuations to lie in a bounded range (e.g. [0, 1]). This is unsatisfying, however, because it
re-introduces the very source of sampling bias that we wanted to solve by running an auction. That
is, bidders who happen to value their privacy at a higher rate than allowed by the mechanism will
simply not participate in the auction, which might systematically skew the resulting estimate in a
way that we cannot measure.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
The main contribution of this paper is to formalize the notion of auctions for private data, and
to show that the design space of such auctions can without loss of generality be taken to be the
simple setting of multi-unit procurement auctions. This initiates an intriguing new area of study
that raises many questions. Among these are:
1. What is the proper benchmark for auctions in our setting? In this paper, we used the class
of fixed-price (or envy free) mechanisms, which has become standard in the field of prior-free
mechanism design [HR08, HK07]. Is there a more natural benchmark?
2. We have shown that generically, no direct revelation mechanism can compensate individuals
for the loss of privacy which results from correlations between their private data and their
reported costs for privacy. Nevertheless, such correlations exist! It is unsatisfying to restrict
individual valuations for privacy to lie in a bounded range, because this reintroduces the
very source of bias that we hoped to overcome by designing auctions. However, is there
some restricted sense in which we can protect (and compensate users for) the privacy of their
valuations for privacy? This requires the development of new models.
3. We have assumed throughout this paper that the private bits of the users, bi are already known
to some database administrator such as a hospital, or are otherwise verifiable. Although this
is a natural assumption in some settings, what if it does not hold? Is there any way to mediate
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the purchase of private data directly from individuals who have the power to lie about their
private data?
4. In this paper we considered an extremely simple market, in which there was a single data
analyst wanting to buy data from a population. How about a two sided market, in which
there are multiple data analysts, competing for access to the private data from multiple
populations? Can we privately compute the market clearing prices for access to data in this
way?
5. In this paper we considered a one-shot mechanism. In reality, the administrator of a private
database will face multiple requests for access to his data as time goes on. How should the
data analyst reason about these online requests and his value for the marginal privacy loss
that he will incur after answering each request?
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